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U.S. v. MICROSOFT: CUI BONO?
George Bittlingmayert
INTRODUCTION
The government's May 1998 antitrust filing against Microsoft rep-
resents the most ambitious antitrust initiative in a generation, easily com-
parable to the IBM and AT&T cases.' Indeed, the case against Microsoft
is more ambitious. The Department of Justice (DOJ) filed the IBM and
AT&T cases when faith in antitrust was strong, when breaking up Gen-
eral Motors and major oil firms represented serious policy options.2 In
recent years, however, activist trust-busting has fallen into disrepute, and
the large-firm monopolization case has become a rarity. Thus, DOJ's
case against Microsoft represents a potential shift in policy, a possible
return to the antitrust activism of the 1960s and 1970s, especially in light
of DOJ's April 2000 brief urging Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson to im-
pose divestiture on Microsoft.3 The case will influence antitrust for a
broad spectrum of industries. Arguably, it will also shape other types of
policies governing high tech industry.
At this important juncture, we do well to distinguish the narrow
legal case from the broader policy issues. The legal case against
Microsoft revolves around two economic questions: (1) is Microsoft a
"monopoly"? and (2) have its business practices thwarted the develop-
ment of better and cheaper products? Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson
has offered affirmative answers to both questions. He believes that
t Professor of Finance, University of Kansas. Ph.D; University of Chicago. This paper
was prepared for the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 1999 Symposium on Intersec-
tions in the Law: Antitrust Meets Intellectual Property.
1 See U.S. v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232, Complaint, May 18, 1998; U.S. v.
International Business Machines, Docket No. 69 Civ. 200 (DNE) Southern District of New
York, January 17, 1969; U.S. v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (civil action no. 74-
1698) November 20, 1974.
2 See In re Exxon Corp. et al., FrC Docket 8934 (seeking divestitures in petroleum).
The Department of Justice had been eyeing General Motors in the early 1960s. "GM was then
[1963] widely suspected of trying to hold its market share down, so as not to rouse the dogs of
antitrust." Carol J. Loomis, Dinosaurs? (Three Firms in Decline), FORTUNE, May 3, 1993, at
36. The subject still got serious consideration in the early 1970s. See LAWRENCE J. WHrTE,
THE AUTOMOBIE INDUSTRY SINCE 1945 (1971). For a history of divestiture efforts, see Wil-
liam E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations - The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sher-
man Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IowA L. REv. 1105-1150 (1989).
3 See U.S. v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) Plaintiffs' Proposed Final
Judgment, April 28, 2000.
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Microsoft is a monopoly and that its practices have hurt consumers.4 I
disagree. But even if Judge Jackson is right, the case might still be a
mistake. "Has Microsoft been bad?" represents the beginning of a policy
inquiry. In the end, this antitrust initiative requires a persuasively posi-
tive answer to another question: "Will suing Microsoft do any good?"
Will this case and others like it serve the public interest?
As did Senators in ancient Rome, we can get closer to the heart of
the matter by asking, "cui bono?" - for whose benefit? The interplay of
private interest illuminates the public interest.
For the Microsoft case, we can ask "cui bono?" in at least four
ways:
* Who benefits from antitrust?
* Who benefits from Microsoft's large market shares
for desktop operating systems and applications?
" Who benefits from Microsoft's browser war with
Netscape?
* Who benefits from the case against Microsoft?
As pertinent as these questions may be, antitrust economists as a
group do not have a good record in providing answers. In a recent article
on the use of expert witnesses, Judge Richard Posner pointed to antitrust
economics as an example of field with no professional consensus. "A
perfectly respectable economist might be an antitrust 'hawk,' another
equally respectable economist a 'dove.' ... [A] judge or jury would have
little basis for choosing between them."' 5 The economics profession has
generated more heat than light on the question of antitrust policy in
practice.
I propose to regain some of our lost honor by following the example
of seventeenth century English scientist Robert Boyle6 by attempting to
set aside philosophical and theoretical questions on which interested par-
ties are unlikely to reach a consensus and focusing instead on an aggres-
sive empiricism. What do we really know? What can we demonstrate
with the facts?
I. WHO BENEFITS FROM ANTITRUST?
Who should benefit from antitrust? From the early days of the
Sherman Act and throughout the twentieth century, the aim of antitrust
4 U.S. v. Microsoft, Findings of Fact, Civil Action 98-1232 (TPJ), November 5, 1999;
U.S. v. Microsoft, Conclusions of Law, Civil Action 98-1232 (TPJ), April 3, 2000.
5 Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, 13 J.
ECON. PERSP. 91, 96 (1999).
6 See generally THE EARLY ESSAYS AND ETmcs OF ROBERT BOYLE (John T. Harwood
ed., 1991).
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was unclear. The Sherman Act arose at the same time as, and arguably
in response to, new methods of production and new forms of economic
organization. The "trusts" embodied much that was both feared and re-
vered in these new methods and forms, and public debate was openly
schizophrenic about the "trust and corporation question." Antitrust was
supposed to protect consumers against the high prices of alleged monop-
olists, but it also was supposed to protect "small dealers and worthy
men," in the words of Justice Peckham in Trans-Missouri.7 The aim was
to square the circle: protect consumers from high prices while protecting
competitors from the trusts. It is a pleasure to report that open, public
defense of the goal of protecting "small dealers and worthy men" finally
fell into intellectual disrepute about twenty years ago, though it still in-
spires some policy discussions.8
Policy analysts - economists and antitrust scholars - compounded
the problem of inconsistent goals with willful ignorance of antitrust's
actual effects. The sober verdict of Nobel Laureate George Stigler is
instructive. More than any other individual, Stigler shaped modem in-
dustrial organization, the branch of economics most relevant for antitrust
7 U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) ('Trade or com-
merce under those circumstances may nevertheless be badly and unfortunately restrained by
driving out of business the small dealers and worthy men whose lives have been spent therein,
and who might be unable to readjust themselves to their altered surroundings. Mere reduction
in the price of the commodity dealt in might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a class and
the absorption of control over one commodity by an all-powerful combination of capital."); see
also Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979)
(political values should be included in antitrust policy); RoaER H. Boiuc, THE ANtITRusT
PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WrH ITSELF 50-89 (1978) (arguing for economic efficiency);
Thomas W. Hazlett, The Legislative History of the Sherman Act Re-examined, 30 EcoN. IN-
QuRY 263 (1992) (the Sherman Act was passed to satisfy needs of several political groups,
including rent-creation for the Republican congress); Robert L. Bradley Jr., On the Origins of
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 9 CATO J. 737 (1990) (Sherman Act was a diversion for the McKin-
ley Tariff of 1890); Andrew N. Kleit, Common Law, Statute Law, and the Theory of Legisla-
tive Choice - An Inquiry into the Goal of the Sherman Act, 31 EcON. INQuIRY 647 (1993)
(concluding that the aim was to maximize efficiency); THE PoLMcAL EcoNoMY OF = SEER-
MAN AcT: THE FiRsT ONE HuNDRED YEARS (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991) (collection of
articles with various views); William E. Kovacic and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust policy: A century
of economic and legal thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (Winter 2000) (surveying thought but
not actual effects of antitrust).
8 See The Goals of Competition Law, Conference on Trade and Competition Policy
before the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, May 13-14, 1997 (prepared remarks of
Debra A. Valentine) (visited June 14, 2000) <http:lwww.ftc.gov/speeches/0ther/dv-
speech.htm> ('Today there is widespread consensus that the purpose of the U.S. antitrust laws
is to ensure a competitive market."); Ernest Gellhor and William E. Kovacic, ANTRUST L.
& ECON. 35 (1994) ("Although mainstream judicial analysis today reflects a goals hierarchy
dominated by efficiency, this pattern is not universal."); Edward S. Herman, The Threat from
Mergers, DoLLARS & SENsE, May/June 1998, at 10-13 (advocating active deconcentration on
both efficiency and political grounds).
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analysis. 9 He was also a vocal supporter of spirited antitrust enforce-
ment.10 In fact, in the early 1950s Stigler advocated that the government
divest a "few dozen" of our largest corporations." Over time he tem-
pered his views, but in an interview conducted thirty years later, he
averred: "I like the Sherman Act."'
2
Despite his predilection for activist antitrust policy, Stigler con-
cluded in the early 1980s that "there have been no persuasive studies of
the effects of the Sherman and Clayton Acts throughout this century.
13
Economists had dropped the ball. Many continue to drop the ball. The
actual effects of antitrust are terra incognita. For example, the influen-
tial Handbook of Industrial Organization, edited by Richard Schmalen-
see and Robert Willig, does not deal with empirical studies of antitrust
enforcement - either causes or effects. Indeed, it has no index entry for
"antitrust."' 4 Ironically, Schmalensee is Microsoft's chief economic
expert.
In the absence of a serious empirical defense of antitrust as actually
carried out, a number of economists have advocated elimination or
greatly scaled back enforcement of antitrust policy. Former MIT busi-
ness school dean Lester Thurow, who tends to favor an activist role for
government, argues that "the time has come to recognize that the anti-
trust approach has been a failure. The costs it imposes far exceed any
benefits it brings.' u5 Milton Friedman, who typically favors a restrained
role for government, recently reflected on his changing views on antitrust
at a conference that dealt with the interaction of government and high
technology industries, and specifically with the Microsoft case:
My own views about the antitrust laws have developed
greatly over time. When I started in this business, as a
believer in competition, I was a great supporter of anti-
9 Jacob Mincer and Richard Schmalensee, The Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics:
George Stigler's Contributions to Economics, 85 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF ECON. 61 (1983).
10 Stigler was a member of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust laws, which produced a report advocating stricter enforcement. ATTORNY. GEN.
ERAL'S NATIONAL CommirTrE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1955) (co-chairmen, Stanley
N. Barnes, S. Chesterfield Oppenheim).
11 See George J. Stigler, The Case Against Big Business, 45 FORTUNE, May 1952, at
123.
12 Thomas Hazlett, Interview With George Stigler, REASON, Vol. 15, No. 9, January
1984. In contrast, Stigler viewed legislation in other contexts as the outcome of political
forces, rather than a disinterested expression of the public interest. See George J. Stigler, The
Economic Theory of Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MOMT. Sci. 67 (1971).
13 George J. Stigler, THE ECONOMIST AS PREACHER, AND OTHER ESSAYS 44 (1982).
14 See HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D.
Willig eds., 1989).
15 LESTER C. THuRow, THE ZERO-SUM Soca-ry (1980), quoted in CATO HANDBOOK FOR
CONGRESS: 105' CONGRESS, (visited June 14, 2000) <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/
hb105-39.html>.
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trust laws, I thought it was one of the few desirable
things that the government could do in order to promote
more competition. But as you watch what actually hap-
pened, you saw that instead of antitrust laws promoting
competition, it tended to do exactly the opposite. Be-
cause they tended, like so many government activities, to
be taken over by the people they were supposed to regu-
late and control. And so over time, I have gradually
come to the conclusion that antitrust does far more harm
than good and that we would be better off if we didn't
have it at all, if we could get rid of it.16
In rejecting antitrust policy, Thurow and Friedman rely on the ab-
sence of evidence supporting antitrust and an informal assessment of our
long experience with actual policy. A few economists and lawyers have
tackled the question of antitrust policy's origins and actual effects head
on. One of the hosts for this conference, Fred McChesney, has been
asking the right questions and getting some surprising answers. His book
with Bill Shughart on the Causes and Consequences of Antitrust brings
together recent scholarship on antitrust as actually carried oUt.17 The
Sherman Act had its origins, at least in part, in attempting to restrain new
competitive forces. But in fact; early enforcement may actually have
promoted rather than retarded the formation of the modem large firm.
Enforcement reflects political forces; and, in practice, the law may very
well have reduced output.
In the Microsoft case, history offers little hope that the government
will demonstrably achieve its stated objective of promoting the public
good. In fact, the case may generate significant but often overlooked
damage. In the past, the actual effect of antitrust enforcement has been
precisely the opposite of its intended effects. Antitrust policy en-
couraged the growth of big business at the turn of the century, and the
growth of the ill-fated conglomerate mergers in the 1960s. Sporadic and
vitriolic attacks on business carried out in the name of anti-monopoly
campaigns unsettled business confidence during Teddy Roosevelt's leg-
endary trust-busting, during Thurman Arnold's tenure as the New Deal's
antitrust chief, and at other points.18
16 The Suicidal Impulse of the Business Community, Luncheon Address, Cato Institute
Conference on Washington D.C. v. Silicon Valley, November 21, 1998 (unedited transcript of
Milton Freidman) (visited June 14, 2000) <http:llwww.cato.orglevents/friedman.html>.
17 See THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANrrRUST: A PUBLIC-CHoICE PERSPECTIVE
(Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shugart II eds., 1995); Fred S. McChesney, Law's Honour
Lost. the plight of antitrust, 31 ANrTrRUST BULL. 359 (1986).
18 See George Bittlingmayer, Stock Returns, Real Activity, and the Trust Question, 47 J.
FIN. 1701 (1992) (offering statistical evidence linking antitrust enforcement and declines in the
stock market 1904-44 and summary of historical developments); George Bittlingmayer, The
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Even without evidence of actual effects, the leaps of logic and spec-
ulative forays that formed the basis for policy in the 1950s, '60s and '70s
came under attack from legal scholars such as Robert Bork, Richard Pos-
ner and Frank Easterbrook. 19 The balance shifted and today even the
defenders of an activist policy will often admit, in the words of post-
perestroika communists, that "mistakes were made. 20 Few today would
defend the leading cases in the horror cabinet of antitrust policy - Brown
Shoe,2l Von's Grocery,22 Procter & Gamble,23 or the FTC suit claiming
that ready-to-eat cereal companies had monopolized shelf space in
America's super markets by needlessly proliferating cereal types.
24
However, while it is clear from the record that antitrust policy can
go too far, the excesses of the past have not silenced the calls for "mod-
erate," "reasonable" enforcement.25 Those calls make the case for the
red-wine theory of antitrust. A bottle of antitrust a day hurts, but a glass
a day helps. The historical economic evidence and common sense sup-
port the first half of the red-wine theory. A bottle a day would be the
road to ruin. However, economists have produced little systematic evi-
dence that a glass a day helps.
If consumers don't clearly benefit from antitrust policy, who does?
The managers of firms beleaguered by competitors often appeal to the
antitrust authorities, and a growing literature points to the use of antitrust
to constrain competitors. 26 It is perhaps only human to equate damage to
one's own livelihood with damage to the public interest. Indeed, the
unsavory spectacle of competitors pleading for protection in Washington
Stock Market and Early Antitrust Enforcement, 36 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1993) (historical and
statistical treatment of the antirust policy and the stock market during the Panic of 1907);
George Bittlingmayer, Antitrust and Business Activity: The First Quarter Century, 70 Bus,
HIST. REv. 363 (1996) (history of the Progressive Era policy struggle and debate, and statisti-
cal linking output changes and antitrust).
19 See ROBERT H. BorK, THE ANcrmusT PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR wrrT ITSELF
(1978); R CHARD A. POSNER, ANTrrRusT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECrnE (1976); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1696 (1986).
20 W. PAUL COCKSHOTr & ALLIN COTTRELL, TowARDS A NEw SocIALUsM: INTRODUC-
TION (1993) (stating that "important policy mistakes were made" under communist-style so-
cialism) (visited June 14, 2000) <http:lricardo.ecn.wfu.edul-cottrell/socialismbookl
intro.html>.
21 Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
22 U.S. v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
23 FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
24 See FTC v. Kellog et al., Docket No. 8883 (April 26, 1972).
25 Those calls were particularly strong at the end of the Reagan administration. See
Thomas Krattenmaker & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and the Reagan Admilnis-
tration, 33 ANrrusT BuLL. 211 (1988); Report of the American Bar Association Section of
Antitrust Law Task Force on the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, 58
ANTrrRUST L. J. 747 (1989); Stephen Labaton, Business and the Law: New Leadership's Anti-
trust Policy, N. Y. TnMEs, October 17, 1988, at D2.
26 William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition,
28 J. LAW ECON. 247 (1985).
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has a long history that predates early 1990s investigations of Microsoft
and continues today. In the 1980s, Chrysler urged the Federal Trade
Commission to prohibit the joint venture between General Motors and
Toyota. It also filed a private suit.27 More recently, Intergraph com-
plained about Intel to the Federal Trade Commission, and those com-
plaints led to an FTC suit against Intel.28
Bureaucrats and lawmakers also benefit from antitrust policy. They
gain power and influence, and, perhaps most importantly, valuable expe-
rience for post-agency employment.2 9 State attorneys general can use
high-profile cases to generate publicity and often head-line grabbing cash
or in-kind settlements.30 Legislators who investigate can hold out the
threat of intervention to obtain influence and campaign contributions.
31
When agencies do act, the legislators can intervene on behalf of constitu-
ents. 32 Clearly, also, the antitrust bar and economic consultants benefit.
During the last years of the Reagan administration and during the Bush
administration, the bar led calls for more activist enforcement.
33
The interest of hard-pressed competitors, regulators and the bar in
stricter enforcement is clear. The interest of consumers is not. With
over one hundred years of antitrust to draw on, we have no persuasive
body of evidence that antitrust policy has increased output and raised
economic welfare. The systematic evidence favors the finding that anti-
trust policy has at least been as likely to do harm as good.
II. WHO BENEFITS FROM MICROSOFT'S LARGE
MARKET SHARE?
Regardless of the effects of antitrust overall, the antitrust case
against Microsoft may still be a good idea. Whether it is depends, in
part, on how we interpret Microsoft's large market share. How did
Microsoft become so successful?
27 See Peter Dworkin, Chrysler Drops GM-Toyota Antitrust Suit, SAN FRANcIsco
CHmoNrcLE, April 13, 1985, at 52.
28 See Christopher Grimes, FTC Accuses Intel Of Bullying Customers In Trust Suit, Dow
JoNEs NEws SEwicE, June 8, 1998.
29 See Brian Grmley, Government Work Pays - After You Leave, WALL ST. J., September
13, 1999, at Al (chronicling the post-government rewards for Reed Hundt, former Federal
Communications Commissioner).
30 See James V. Grimaldi, Microsoft Trial Puts States Back in Seat: Out for Blood, They
Must Follow the Feds' Lead, SEArrtE Tnmss, December 26, 1999; Tanya Schevitz, UC Berke-
ley Given $2 Million For Health Care Research/Levi -Strauss antitrust settlement seeds new
center, SAN FRANCIsco CHRONiCLE, June 24, 1999, at A25.
31 See George Bittlingmayer & Thomas W. Hazlett, DOS Kapital: Has Antitrust Action
against Microsoft Created Value in the Computer Industry? 55 J. Fin. EcoN. 329 (2000).
32 See Roger L. Faith et al., Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J. L. & EcON. 329 (1982).
33 See George Bittlingmayer, The Antitrust Vision Thing: How Did Bush Measure Up?
ANTrmusT BuLL., forthcoming.
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A high market share seems to imply monopoly or at least some mar-
ket power. Netscape's CEO, Jim Barksdale, exploited this presumption
in Senate hearings in 1998. To Barksdale, Microsoft's nearly exclusive
role as provider of operating systems to Intel-processor-based desktop
PC's seemed to speak for itself. "That's a monopoly," he concluded.
34
Barksdale may have been a gifted CEO of Netscape, but he ne-
glected what any school child should know: a company may have a high
market share because its products are better or cheaper. Nefarious exclu-
sion of competitors represents only one method of capturing the market.
A high market share could indicate monopoly, or its opposite, competi-
tion. In the one case, consumers suffer high prices and inferior products.
In the other case, they enjoy low prices and superior products.
The question of how Microsoft got and how it maintains its high
market share is central to the case, and also has had an intensely practical
aspect. Since Judge Jackson has determined that Microsoft has a "mo-
nopoly," he was able to hold it to a stringent standard of behavior.35 The
"monopoly" label will also encourage private antitrust suits.
Could Microsoft raise its prices and innovate less? Could it do so
and survive very long? We do well to remember the long list of desktop
operating systems that have come and gone. These include CP/M (Con-
trol Program for Microcomputers), which was a DOS-like operating sys-
tem that briefly held sway in the early 1980s. Later, Apple's Mac OS
gave Microsoft's DOS a run for its money until Microsoft created Win-
dows, a Mac-like shell for DOS. In the early 1990s, Apple founder Steve
Jobs created NeXT, and IBM threw its weight behind OS/2. Linux,
which is based on Unix, is currently making inroads against Microsoft.
36
With the benefit of hindsight, we can explain why Microsoft ob-
tained and continues to hold a large share market share in desktop sys-
tems, and we can do so without resorting to allegations of wrong-doing.
The contrast with Apple is particularly instructive. Bill Gates seems to
have understood what economists now call "network economies." His
company charged low prices for the operating system and encouraged
producers of computers and peripheral products to compete on price and
innovation.37 In contrast, Apple strategy guru Jean-Louis Gas~e deliber-
34 Lisa M. Bowman & Maria Seminerio, Hatch Hearings: Now What? ZD NET Naws,
March 4, 1998 (visited June 14, 2000) <http:llwww.zdnet.comlzdnnlcontentlzdnn/0303/
290925.html>.
35 U.S. v. Microsoft, Conclusions of Law, Civil Action 98-1232 (TPJ), April 3, 2000.
36 See Shuan Bangay, A HISTORY OF OPERATING SYSTEMs 2000 (visited June 14, 2000)
<http:llcsshaun.cs.ru.ac.za/osnotes/osnotes002.html>.
37 See Michael A. Cusumano & Richard W. Selby, MIcRosoFr SECRETS: How THE
WORLD'S MOST PowEuRM. SoFrWARE CoMPANY CREFES TECHNOLOGY, SHAPES MARKETS,
AND MANAGES PEOPLE 174 (1995); Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, WINNERS,
LOSERS & MICRosOFr: COMPETrMON AND ANTrrRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 154-156 (1999).
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ately rejected the pursuit of market share and followed a "high-right"
strategy, which meant a high-price, low-market-share strategy. Apple
also insisted on selling and controlling both the operating system and
hardware.
38
In retrospect, Apple's strategy was a blunder. To be sure, Microsoft
was not infallible either, as its foray into on-line services with MSN
demonstrated, but its focus in the operating system market on a less-than-
perfect but cheap and open platform proved to be the right competitive
choice. That fundamental fact makes highly ironic the testimony and
declarations of the government's economic experts, who assert that
Microsoft is a monopoly and has market power.39 For this assertion, they
rely on the ambiguous fact of a high market share, and on the allegation
of high switching costs that generate "lock-in." However, the assertion
of switching costs and lock-in are not empirical findings. They are, re-
spectively, assertions of what might be true as fact and what might occur
in theory. Under the assumption of high-enough switching costs, we
might get stuck, in theory, with an expensive, inferior operating system
that is immune to competitive forces.
Some economists have indeed proposed an important role for lock-
in generating "market failure," and in particular market failure that is
remediable through the instrument of antitrust. These arguments played
an important role in the objection raised by an anonymous group of
Silicon Valley companies to Microsoft's proposal in 1995 to merge with
Intuit, the company that sells Quicken and Turbo-Tax (and its Mac vari-
ant, MacIntax).40 In the current instance, the Department of Justice's
experts presented a speculative case for inefficient lock-in to justify the
finding of monopoly. Lock-in allegedly creates a barrier to entry, which
in turn creates a monopoly.41
It turns out, however, that the case for lock-in is speculative even in
the most favorable setting. The textbook case of lock-in is based on
Microsoft chair Bill Gates has of course also maintained that his firm favors a low-price, high-
volume strategy. See Bill Gates, Compete, don't delete, ECONOMIST, June 13, 1998, at 19.
38 Jim CARLTON, APPLE: THE INSIDE STORY oF INRrGuE, EGoMANIA, AND BusINEss
BLUNDERS 108-130 (1997).
39 U.S. v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) Direct Testimony of Rick Warren-
Boulton, at 20-28; U.S. v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ), Direct Testimony of
Franklin Fisher, May 12, 1998, at 22.
40 See Gary Reback et al., Technological, Economic and Legal Perspectives Regarding
Microsoft's Strategy in Light of the Proposed Acquisition of Intuit, Inc., (1995) (visited June
14, 2000) <http:llwww.antitrust.orglcasesmicrosofttwhitep.btml>.
41 U.S. v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ), Declaration of Franklin M. Fisher,
May 12, 1998, at 2,4 (dominance of Windows is protected by network effects; network effects
create high barriers to competition). U.S. v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ), Direct
Testimony of Frederick R. Warren-Boulton at 3, 22 ('The software 'lock-in' phenomenon
creates a barrier to entry for new PC operating systems").
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QWERTY, the standard keyboard.42 The layout of keys was originally
designed to minimize the jamming of typeface, but on modem key-
boards, this is no longer a problem. Economic theorists claimed that, as
a result of hypothesized high switching costs, we were stuck with an
inefficient keyboard despite the existence of other, demonstrably more
efficient alternatives.
43
As economists Liebowitz and Margolis have shown, however, the
QWERTY keyboard is not demonstrably inefficient. The leading com-
petitor, the Dvorak keyboard, does not yield substantial gains in effi-
ciency. It turns out then, that the leading example of the alleged
inefficiency created by switching costs and lock-in finds no support in
fact.44 Liebowitz and Margolis also provide evidence against the view
that desktop software markets exhibit lock-in. With lock-in, one would
expect inferior products to prevail despite the appearance of better alter-
natives. However, in category after category, whether spreadsheets,
word processing, money management, or desktop publishing, the product
with the best reviews attains the highest market share, regardless of
which product had the higher market share initially. In some cases, the
Microsoft product earned the largest market share - in other cases
Microsoft's competitors won.
45
The states' economic expert, Dr. Frederick Warren-Boulton, pointed
to Microsoft's high margins and high market capitalization as signs of
market power.46 However, in software and other markets characterized
by network effects and easy "scalability," we expect winner-take-all out-
comes. Competition in such markets results in one successful firm with
a high margin and high market value. From a broader economic perspec-
tive, the returns to the winner are the returns to all investments made in
the desktop computer business, including the failures.
In summary, the economic experts testifying for the DOJ and the
states focused on a set of faulty indicators of monopoly: high market
share, high margins, high capitalization and the theoretical case for lock-
in. Tellingly, they did not focus on the "sine qua non" of monopoly:
high prices.
By the best available evidence, Microsoft charges about $50 for a
copy of Windows. It turns out that this number constitutes a very small
fraction of the final price of a functioning desktop computer, roughly 2.5
percent on average. Intuitively, such a low price for a crucial component
42 See Paul A. David, Clio and the economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. EcoN. Rnv. 332
(1985).
43 See W. Brian Arthur, NcR.i_.Asnro REruRNs AND PATH DEPDEN CE IN THE EcONOMY
xvii (1994) (influence of the QWERTY example on Arthur's thinking about inefficient paths).
44 See LEBOW=z & MARGOLIS, supra note 38, at 19-46.
45 See iL at 135-234.
46 See Warren-Boulton, supra note 37, at 28.
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hardly confirms the judgment that Microsoft has a "chokehold" on the
market for desktop computing that it mercilessly exploits. Less intui-
tively, a widely used formula in economics, the so-called Lemer Index,
allows us to infer from this low price that Microsoft acts as though it has
very little power over price.47 In the language of economics, Microsoft
acts as though the demand for computers with Microsoft's Windows op-
erating system is very elastic, which implies the opposite of monopoly
power. Plausible calculations would place the "price elasticity of de-
mand" for a Windows-based PC at roughly -30, which indicates a higher
level of competition than that faced by the typical branded good.
48
How do we explain the low price for the operating system and ap-
parent lack of market power? First, as Apple's high-price strategy for
the Mac showed, a high price can be the road to ruin, or least a small
market share in desktop computers. Microsoft's strategy of charging a
low price and encouraging competition among producers of personal
computers and peripheral products protects it against actual and potential
competition. Second, a high price for its operating system would en-
courage piracy. At, say, $300 instead of $50 per copy of Windows, some
computer manufacturers might sell computers without operating systems,
leaving installation, from whatever source, to the buyers. Third,
Microsoft's new operating systems compete with its own installed base.
This is the problem any producer of a durable good faces. Most potential
purchasers of Windows 2000 have the option of continuing to use Win-
dows 98 or Windows 95. Finally, Microsoft sells a variety of applica-
tions, often for several hundred dollars per copy. Consequently, it has an
interest in the widespread adoption of the operating system to which it
writes its latest and most powerful application programs. It has an inter-
est in the widespread adoption of personal computers running an inex-
pensive operating system. As Liebowitz and Margolis showed,
Microsoft has gained or lost market share in these application markets on
the merits, that is, in competition with other products.
What we see when we move beyond speculation about market share
and lock-in is the fact of a low-price, high volume policy that has met
customer demand for a de facto standard in operating systems. On the
basis of obvious and very straightforward facts, we can explain
Microsoft's past and current behavior and the actual outcome as the re-
sult of robust competition. The gains to consumers have been palpable.
As computer users, we are better off than we were ten years ago. Users
47 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner: Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HAR.
L. REv., 937 (1981).
48 The most powerful monopoly would have an elasticity of-i; the typical branded good
has an elasticity between -2 and -10; and the perfectly competitive firm has an elasticity of
minus infinity.
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can easily transfer files; and Windows-based users can choose from a
large variety of application programs. The assertion that we would be
even better off had we followed some alternative course of action invites
a speculative morass.
I. WHO BENEFITS FROM MICROSOFT'S BROWSER WAR
WITH NETSCAPE?
The browser war between Netscape and Microsoft was carried out
only partly with intense price competition. Equally important were vari-
ous restrictions, alliances and agreements. These turn out to be the actual
bone of contention. As the late William Baxter pointed out, charging
high prices is not a crime under U.S. antitrust law. "The simple and
classical exercise of market power - namely restriction of output and
setting prices in excess of marginal cost - is not regarded as a bad act."4
9
Nor is the oxymoron of monopoly and low prices against the law - un-
less of course prices are too low, which invites the charge of predation.
Rather, monopoly together with a variety of possible "bad acts" consti-
tute antitrust crimes. These possible bad acts typically include restric-
tions on customers - exclusive dealing or bundling, for example. The
have in common the arguable effect of harming competitors and hence,
derivatively, harming consumers, though it bears emphasis that the sec-
ond does not flow automatically from the first.
The government's case against Microsoft rests on precisely this
combination - an assertion of monopoly and an allegation of bad acts
that likely hurt competitors and probably hurt consumers. 50 Though not
explicitly stated, the Microsoft case involves what has come to be called
"non-price predation." A company incurs costs or gives up revenues in
order to hurt a competitor, in this case Netscape, hoping to make up any
losses with higher profits later on.
Specifically, the case rests on the charge that Microsoft attempted to
protect its own monopoly operating system against competition from
Netscape's Navigator browser through the following practices:
* Giving away its Internet Explorer browser for free.
* Offering some customers, such as Intuit, money to
adopt its browser.
* Specifying that OEMs have to install its browser.
* "Bundling" its browser with Windows.
49 See William Baxter, Substitutes, Complements, and the Contours of the Firm, in THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CoMPErrnoN POLICY 27, 30 (Frank Mathewson, Michael Trebilcock,
and Michael Walker eds., 1990).
50 "Microsoft possesses... monopoly power... Collectively, Microsoft's contracts
with OEMs, ISPS, and ICPs have unreasonably restrained... competition in the market for
Internet browsers." Complaint, supra note 1, at 1, 11.
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* Agreeing to promote ISP's in return for the ISP's
promoting Microsoft's browser exclusively or
prominently.5 1
These sorts of antitrust charges have been among the most conten-
tious in an already contentious field. Not surprisingly, the legal rules
have been vague and unstable.5 2 Economists are also divided about the
possible effects of these practices, though their debate has been mostly
theoretical, rather than empirical. A folk theorem summarizes the spirit
of the discussion: "Given a controversial business practice, both competi-
tive and monopoly explanations exist."
In the current instance, we may be able to clear the thicket by distin-
guishing between the obvious, first-order consequences of Microsoft's
business practices and the less obvious, speculative consequences. In the
case of each monopoly charge we have consequences for: (1) some com-
bination of competitors and suppliers of complementary products; and
(2) consumers.
On the first charge, giving browsers away certainly lowers the price
of browsers. Indeed in this case, Microsoft's zero price for Internet Ex-
plorer forced Netscape to give away its browser.5 3 This was good for
consumers in the first instance, and bad for Netscape. The period of the
browser war, roughly 1995 to the present, saw a remarkable expansion in
the use of the internet.5 4 Computer manufacturers benefited because free
browsers and free content made computers more useful. It is of course
possible that sharp price competition between the two browsers will ulti-
mately lead to monopoly and high prices for either browsers or operating
systems. This has not yet happened, and past and current developments
point the other way.
Providing incentives for customers (like Intuit) to adopt a product
encourages wider distribution of a particular product. The obvious con-
sequence is a gain for consumers - the product shows up where it might
otherwise not. The less obvious consequences are a mixed bag. Given
the network nature of much software, and perhaps especially browsers,
51 Complaint, supra note 1, at 5, 6, 7, 9.
52 "For most this century, the Supreme Court shed little light on these issues [attempts to
monopolize], and lower court decisions reflected considerable disarray." Gellhorn & Kovacic,
supra note 8, at 154. "The rule of reason approach to tie-ins proved short-lived." Ld. at 331.
"[Existing tying doctrine] has confused the lower courts." Id. at 338. "The [Supreme] Court
has not addressed substantive exclusive dealing standards in over 30 years." Id. at 346.
53 CARL SHAPIRO AND HAL VARIAN, INPORMAnON RuLEs 292 (1999).
54 The U.S. had over 50 million households subscribing to internet services in the first
quarter of 2000. This represented a 62 percent increase over the same figure two years earlier.
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the use of incentives in promotion may represent part of the competition
to become the de facto network standard. The speculative downside is
the effect on competitors, like Netscape, which may find themselves
pushed out of some distribution channels.
Requiring OEMs to install browsers means that more people will
have a browser on their Windows machines. Microsoft insisted that as a
condition for licensing its Windows operating system, OEMs provide a
second, related piece of software (Internet Explorer) for free.55 Consum-
ers have an obvious gain, Netscape loses. OEMs are relegated to what is
perhaps their appropriate spot - intensely competitive suppliers of the
"commodity" hardware on which the operating system runs. Arguments
based on "network economies" favor the maintenance across hardware
platforms of a uniform computing environment for operating systems
and browsers, which constitute "near-operating system" software on the
theory of the case.
"Bundling" or integrating the browser with the operating system of-
fers the prospect of easier-to-use products. Since the extra cost of the
bundled browser was zero, consumers come out ahead. Clearly, a
browser bundled with Windows makes Navigator's product less attrac-
tive. Beyond that, we move to tenuous ground. We do have some paral-
lels from the past, however. Microsoft has incorporated a string of stand-
alone utilities and programs in its operating system, sometimes through
acquisition, sometimes through head-to-head competition. It would be
difficult to argue that consumers suffered because they no longer had to
install separate software programs and wrestle with compatibility
problems. The difference this time around has been Netscape's size and
the importance of browsers. Given the difficulty of predicting technical
developments, we cannot rule out the possibility that the current distinc-
tions between operating systems, applications and browsers will be radi-
cally altered.
Finally, promoting an ISP if it in turn sells a company's browser
provides the obvious benefit of an extra distribution outlet. This will
make more business sense if the ISP does not promote a competitor's
product. Indeed, manufacturers often restrict the ability of distributors or
retailers to promote competitors' products. Oil companies insist that
their dealers sell only their gasoline; auto manufacturers often restrict the
brands their franchisees may sell. Exclusive dealing focuses the atten-
tion of one type of distributor (the ISP in this case) on aggressive market-
ing of a cluster of services. Microsoft's contracts made life harder for
Netscape. It seems doubtful that consumers were worse off. Those who
55 Complaint supra note 1, at 6.
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wanted to use Netscape's browser could load it off the internet for free.
Millions did.
56
Obviousness is often in the eye of the beholder. Yet it would be
difficult to argue that consumers were clearly harmed by Microsoft ac-
tions in the same way that an economist can argue that sugar price sup-
ports harm consumers. On each one of its charges, the government's
case moves beyond what economic science can demonstrate persuasively
and unambiguously, and heads down the slippery slopes of speculation.
The spectrum of individual charges form the components of an
overarching meta-charge, specifically that the various disputed practices
were a means to an end: protection of Microsoft's operating system from
competition. The core of the case, and perhaps Microsoft's strategy in
the browser market, rests on the alleged danger to the Windows operat-
ing system that stemmed from Netscape Navigator and Java. In theory at
least, Navigator and Java could provide an alternative platform to which
applications could be written. This would have meant that developers
could produce "write once, run anywhere" programs. A single applica-
tion could be written for Windows, Apple, Unix or any other operating
system for which Netscape had written a version of its Navigator
browser.
In practice, these dreams (or fears) are unlikely to be realized. Net-
scape and Java will not "commoditize" operating systems, as Bill Gates
feared in a 1995 memo.57 This was clear even before the case was filed
in May 1998.58 Any doubt has disappeared in the meantime.
59
Microsoft's Windows operating system and its applications do face
threats, but these are likely to come from other operating systems, such
as Linux, or competing platforms, such as hand-held computers and com-
munications devices.
Even under the assumption that Netscape and Java could have
turned Windows into one of only several desktop operating systems, the
theory of the case runs into an obstacle. Assume that Netscape's Naviga-
tor could have become the operating system to which software firms
write applications and Microsoft Windows becomes one of several com-
56 Shapiro & Varian, supra note 31, at 292.
57 Complaint, supra note 1, at 3.
58 Darryl K. Taft and Barbara Darrow, Java: Write Once, Fat Chance, TEcHWEB, No-
vember 22, 1997 (visited June 14, 2000) <http:llwww.techweb.comlwire/news/1997/11/
1l22java.html>; Java: How portable? JavaSoft's 'write once, run anywhere' goal remains
elusive, ZD NEr NEws, July 28, 1997 (visited June 14, 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/pcweek/
news/0728/28java.html>.
59 John Clyman, Does Java Really Matter? PC MAGAZINE, ZD NEr NEws, November 4,
1998 (visited June 14, 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/pcmag/stories/review/
0,6755,2159741,00.htnl>; Alan Reynolds, Breaking Windows: The Justice Department wants
to break Microsoft's stranglehold on... what? Am. OuT.oOK, Summer 1999 (visited June 14,
2000) <http:llwww.hudson.orglAmericanOuflooklarticles._sm99/reynolds.htm>.
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modity operating systems that include the Mac OS, Unix, Linux, etc. In
what way would consumers be better off? We would be trading off
Microsoft's low-price, high-market-share operating system for Net-
scape's high-market-share de facto operating system. Why would we be
better off today with Marc Andreesen, one of Netscape's founders and its
vice-president for Technology, as the operating system monopolist than
we are with Bill Gates as the holder of that title? For the sake of consis-
tency, the government's answer would have to be, ironically, that it
would have to watch Andreesen like a hawk too. This is good news for
antitrust authorities looking for work, but it represents no change for con-
sumers. Indeed, Jim Clark, chair of Netscape, admitted: "I don't doubt,
given absolute power, we might be capable of all sorts of low blows and
eye-gouging. The nicest people can become despots. '60 It bears empha-
sis though that not rough jousting among competitors but the perform-
ance of the marketplace for consumers remains the ultimate aim.
IV. WHO BENEFITS FROM THE CASE AGAINST MICROSOFT?
The long string of investigations, case filings and other actions
against Microsoft offers what amounts to a natural experiment. A large
number of computer companies produce products that are complements
to Microsoft's operating systems. These include the producers of micro-
processors (such as Intel and AMD), desktop systems (Compaq, Dell,
and Gateway), printers (Hewlett-Packard), software (Intuit, Peoplesoft
and Sierra On Line) and components and peripherals (Western Digital,
Read Rite and Syquest). A somewhat smaller but still substantial
number of firms produce items that are substitutes for Microsoft's oper-
ating system and software. These include Apple and Motorola (which
produces Apple's micro-processors). Some firms, such as Novell, pro-
duce products that are both complements to Microsoft's operating system
and substitutes for Microsoft's software.
On the government's theory of the current case and preceding ac-
tions, all of these firms have been suffering or will suffer in the future
from Microsoft's alleged monopoly and alleged monopolizing actions.
Alternatively, they will prosper when the government successfully at-
tacks that monopoly and prevents monopolizing actions. Though con-
sumers may be the ultimate intended beneficiaries of the case, in the first
instance, the theory of the case holds that its fruits will redound to the
benefit of a large number of other firms in the computer industry.
60 Jim Clark (with Owen Edwards), NETSCAPE TnME: THE MAKING oF THE BmUoN-DOL-
LAR START-Up THAT TOOK ON MICROSOFr 235 (1999).
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In a recent work, my co-author Thomas Hazlett and I examined
whether financial markets shared the government's view of the case.
61
When the government moved against Microsoft, did the stock prices of
the alleged victim firms in the computer industry increase? In addition,
when aggressive enforcement against Microsoft suffered setbacks, did
the stock prices of alleged victim firms decrease?
For the years 1991-1997, we isolated 54 events involving an anti-
trust enforcement action against Microsoft. Of these, 29 involved actions
that we could clearly classify as "pro-enforcement." These involved
news leaks of an investigation, rulings favorable to the government,
Judge Stanley Sporkin's rejection of the 1994 consent decree between
the Department of Justice and Microsoft, and the announcement of state-
level action, for example. Another 8 involved "anti-enforcement" ac-
tions. These involved signing of the 1994 consent decree, attempts to
reverse Judge Stanley Sporkin's ruling invalidating the negotiated con-
sent and retreats in DOJ enforcement strategy. We classified the remain-
ing 17 events as ambiguous in its implications for Microsoft and the rest
of the industry because the implications of the event were uncertain (a
hearing ends without a decision) or because of contaminating events
(such as a Microsoft earnings report).
We summarize some of the results from our study in the accompa-
nying table. On average, the announcement of a "pro-enforcement"
event led to a -0.45 percent decline over one day and -1.16 percent de-
cline over three days in the value of Microsoft's stock price. The rest of
the computer industry moved in the same direction, declining on average
-0.26 percent over one day and -0.53 percent over three days. In dollar
terms, the losses to the rest of the industry amounted to $1.2 billion per
event. Over 29 events, this implies a cumulative decline of about $35
billion. However, these estimates likely understate the effects of antitrust
action if markets learned about or suspected impending enforcement ac-
tions in the days and weeks before the news announcement.
By the same token, "anti-enforcement" actions resulted in substan-
tial increases in Microsoft's stock price, 2.65 percent over one day and
2.34 percent over three days. The rest of the industry moved in the same
direction, on average 0.59 percent over one day and 1.15 percent over
three days. Again, these movements imply substantial upward re-valua-
tions of Microsoft's stock and the stock of other companies in the com-
puter industry.
61 George Bittlingmayer & Thomas W. Hazlett, DOS Kapitah Has Antitrust Action
against Microsoft Created Value in the Computer Industry? 55 . FIN. EcoN. 329 (2000).
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TABLE 1
AVERAGE RETURNS FOR MICROSOFT AND THE REST OF
THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY AT ANNOUNCEMENTS OF
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
OVER ONE AND THREE DAYS SURROUNDING
THE ANNOUNCEMENT
1-day 3-day
Microsoft Industry Microsoft Industry
Pro-enforcement -0.45% -0.26% -1.16% -0.53%
n=29
Ambiguous 0.85% -0.13% 0.33% -0.26%
n=17
Anti-enforcement 2.65% 0.59% 2.34% 1.15%
n=8
All Events 0.42% -0.09% -0.16% -0.18%
n=54
Note: The returns used here are adjusted for movements in the general market. "n" refers to the
sample size, in this case the number of days classified as "pro-enforcement," "ambiguous," or "anti-
enforcement."
Source: Bittlingmayer and Hazlett, "DOS Kapital: Has Antitrust Action against Microsoft Created
Value in the Computer Industry?" Journal of Financial Economics, 55 J. FIN. EcoN. 329 (2000).
These results provide an arresting finding. In the judgment of finan-
cial markets, the primary immediate victims of Microsoft's alleged mo-
nopolization, who are also the primary immediate intended beneficiaries
of the DOJ's enforcement actions against Microsoft, suffered when DOJ
or the states proceeded more aggressively or experienced clear victories.
Conversely, the stock value of the intended beneficiaries increased when
DOJ or the states retreated or experienced setbacks.
Our study's results were based on the period January 1991 through
December 1997. Events since then show that aggressive enforcement
actions and good news for the Department of Justice continue to hurt the
computer industry. For example, a June 23, 1998 decision of a three-
judge appeals court panel lifted the preliminary injunction that kept
Microsoft from bundling its browser and operating system.62 The busi-
ness press widely attributed a run-up in tech stock prices to the deci-
sion.63 More recently, Judge Penfield Jackson's April 3, 2000
62 U.S. v. Microsoft, Opinion of the Court of Appeals, USDC No. 94-1564, USCA No.
97-5343, June 23, 1998.
63 Bill Barnhart, Dow Surges as Yen Fears Subside Treasury Bonds Rise; Computer-
Technology Stocks Continue Rally, CmcAGo TRIBUNE, June 24, 1998, at 6 ("A federal appeals
panel overturned a lower- court ruling that enjoined Microsoft from requiring personal-com-
puter manufacturers to provide the Microsoft Internet browser . Semiconductor stocks and
Internet-related stocks boomed."); Tim Smart, Tech Stocks' Rally Leads Dow Up 117, WASH.
PosT, June 24, 1998, at CIO. ("Stocks soared yesterday, led by a powerful rally in technology
issues ignited by a court ruling favorable to Microsoft in the government's ongoing antitrust
case against the software giant.")
U.S v. MicRosoF: Cui BONO?
Conclusions of Law and the revelation that the Department of Justice and
state attorneys general would seek a divestiture also coincided with
strong declines not only in Microsoft stock, but the whole technology
sector.64 Part of the coincidental decline may represent the increased
threat that other successful firms will themselves come under antitrust
scrutiny and face divestiture. Part may reflect the sentiment that with a
divestiture for Microsoft on the table, an anti-business sentiment will
emerge across a broad range of policies.65
It bears emphasis that neither the results of our original study nor
subsequent events speak to the question whether Microsoft is a monop-
oly or has sought a monopoly in ways that hurt consumers. Microsoft
may well have taken actions that hurt consumers - as well as actions that
helped them. However, these stock market movements do speak to the
question whether federal action has helped or hurt other firms in the
computer industry - the very same firms who are Microsoft's alleged
immediate victims. Consequently, it also has a bearing on the question
whether federal action has helped consumers - Microsoft's alleged ulti-
mate victims. The relevant issue is not whether we can imagine that
consumers were hurt but whether actual policy yields improvements. In
the judgment of financial markets, it has not.
V. CONCLUSION
The antitrust case against Microsoft has the ingredients of a poten-
tial mistake. The defendant corporation is a large and habitually aggres-
sive player, and the rise of the computer industry has inspired hopes as
well as fears in business and across broad segments of society. Most
importantly, however, an aggressive legal attack on Microsoft serves the
private interests of a number of players: Microsoft's competitors, Sena-
tors and representatives from states in which those competitors have a
major presence, state attorneys general with political ambitions, antitrust
64 U.S. v. Microsoft, Conclusions of Law, Civil Action. 98-1232 (TPJ), April 3, 2000;
Eileen Glanton, Nasdaq plummets on Microsoft woes, but Dow soars, Associated Press New-
swires, April 3, 2000. ("Microsoft devastated the Nasdaq composite index, falling sharply as
Wall Street anticipated a federal judge's antitrust ruling against the software company. The
plunge in Microsoft set off another stampede away from technology stocks and sent investors
searching for blue-chip issues."); Adam Shell, Microsoft Dives, and Tech Stocks Follow, USA
Today, April 25, 2000, at IA ("Technology stocks faced a new assault Monday as software
giant Microsoft plunged 16% on fresh reports that the company may face a court-ordered
breakup."); Patrice Hill, Microsoft Antitrust Case Lowers Nasdaq , Might Hurt Clinton Ad-
ministration, KRTBN Knight-Ridder Tribune Business News: The Washington Times, April
27, 2000 ("The Justice Department's antitrust case against Microsoft has been pummeling
Microsoft and other popular technology stocks, raising both political and economic risks for
the Clinton administration, analysts say.")
65 James Glassman, Is Government Strangling the New Economy?, WALL ST. J. IhTERAC-
TrvE EDrrION, April 6, 2000 (op-ed piece) ("investors, jarred by the Microsoft decision, have
suddenly woken up to these threats of government intervention").
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officials eager for the limelight and remunerative post-agency employ-
ment, the antitrust bar, and economists and others who would serve as
experts and pundits for this and other cases. The question, "cui bono?" is
easily answered when we confine ourselves to the private interests of the
parties directly involved. Indeed, the case provided the occasion for a
delightful gathering on the Cornell campus in April 1999.
Prosecutors and the courts are likely to make a mistake when influ-
ential private interests point in one direction and the diffusely repre-
sented common good in another. History does not offer much
encouragement. No evidence in the century-long record of antitrust en-
forcement supports the view that sporadic episodes of large-firm monop-
olization charges and forced divestiture benefit the public. Indeed, the
evidence going back to the trust-busting of Teddy Roosevelt and others
supports the conclusion that "trust-busting" hurts the business climate.
The experience with Microsoft suggests that the same conclusion
still holds for recent periods and less extreme swings in policy. Very
little in the decade of antitrust action against Microsoft supports the view
that stepped-up enforcement against this particular large firm offers ben-
efits to the public. To be sure, for the analyst standing at a blackboard,
the effect of Microsoft's practices on consumers is ambiguous -
Microsoft may or may not have hurt consumers. This hardly provides
bedrock for the prosecution. Moreover, the real test is actual enforce-
ment. In keeping with a century's worth of evidence, aggressive en-
forcement appears to have generated palpable damage. Arguably, the
case has harmed the investment climate and prospects of precisely those
firms it was intended to help by generating uncertainty about the future
of the computer industry and about the role of government in it.
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